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Abstract—This paper provides a methodology to study the
PHY layer vulnerability of wireless protocols in hostile radio en-
vironments. Our approach is based on testing the vulnerabilities
of a system by analyzing the individual subsystems. By targeting
an individual subsystem or a combination of subsystems at a time,
we can infer the weakest part and revise it to improve the overall
system performance. We apply our methodology to 4G LTE
downlink by considering each control channel as a subsystem.
We also develop open-source software enabling research and
education using software-defined radios. We present experimental
results with open-source LTE systems and shows how the differ-
ent subsystems behave under targeted interference. The analysis
for the LTE downlink shows that the synchronization signals
(PSS/SSS) are very resilient to interference, whereas the downlink
pilots or Cell-Specific Reference signals (CRS) are the most
susceptible to a synchronized protocol-aware interferer. We also
analyze the severity of control channel attacks for different LTE
configurations. Our methodology and tools allow rapid evaluation
of the PHY layer reliability in harsh signaling environments,
which is an asset to improve current standards and develop new
and robust wireless protocols.
Index Terms – Long-term evolution (LTE); Methodology;
Protocol-aware Jamming; Software-Defined Radio (SDR); Open
source tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications infrastructure is a vital resource
to the economy and defense of the nation, and its protection is
becoming increasingly important. While the commercial sector
continues to increase the use of cellular networks for Internet
access, public safety networks and the military plan to leverage
commercial 4G cellular technology for their communication
needs in emergency situations. The Internet of Things (IoT)
will also impact the number of devices connecting to the
cellular network. Even though the architecture of 5G is still
an open question, there will be key differences with regards to
many characteristics of 4G technology such as the ability to
flexibly use spectrum; order of magnitude reduction in latency;
and most importantly, improved security and privacy [1].
Wireless communication networks provide a multitude of
critical and commercial services and serve an ever increasing
number of users. Ultra-reliable and secure wireless networks
are necessary for national security and public safety, in order to
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provide efficient situation assessment, time-critical assistance
and swift response to potential threats. This is also crucial for
autonomous vehicular networks and unmanned aerial systems,
where even a partial breakdown can have disastrous conse-
quences.
Security and privacy has been a recurrent problem in
wireless communications since the days of analog 1G cellular
networks. Each cellular generation has undergone its share of
research and development related to wireless network attacks
and countermeasures because each new feature introduced can
have a potential vulnerability that can be exploited by an
attacker. Attacks to wireless networks have been the topic of
research for several years [2]-[3].
Lazos et al. [4] propose a randomized distributed channel
establishment scheme based on frequency hopping to address
the problem of control channel jamming in ad-hoc networks.
Bicakci et al. [5] focus on combating Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks in 802.11 devices using practical hardware, software
and firmware solutions. Liu et al. [6] develop a time-delayed
broadcast scheme that partitions the broadcast operation into
a series of unicast transmissions for spread spectrum systems
with insider threats. Chiang et al. [7] introduce a code-
tree system for circumventing cross-layer jamming attacks in
wireless broadcast networks. Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
are adopted in [8] to characterize the sensing behaviors of le-
gitimate and malicious users in collaborative spectrum sensing
settings.
LTE is prone to protocol-aware interference, since the
standards documentation is openly available. There has been
prior work related to RF Jamming of LTE signals. Kakar et al.
[9] investigate the performance of the Physical Control Format
Indicator Channel (PCFICH) under harsh wireless conditions
and propose strategies to mitigate interference on the PCFICH.
Lichtman et al. [10] consider the problem of targeted interfer-
ence on the Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH) and
propose detection and mitigation strategies to counter protocol-
aware jammers. Labib et al. [11] introduce and demonstrate
LTE control channel spoofing, which refers to spoofing by
a fake eNodeB by transmission of a partial LTE downlink
frame. DoS was found to be the result of transmission of the
partial LTE downlink frames containing only the fake control
channels, at a relatively higher power level w.r.t. the legitimate
eNodeB. The authors also propose mitigation strategies that
required simple modification to the cell selection process of
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LTE. In [12], a comprehensive threat assessment of LTE/LTE-
A is provided, highlighting the vulnerabilities of various
LTE physical channels and signals. A survey of mitigation
techniques against various jamming/spoofing attacks is also
provided. Marojevic et al. [13] provide empirical results for
jamming of LTE control channels in a production LTE system,
and propose jammer detection methods using performance
counters and key performance indicators (KPIs).
This paper provides a methodology for assessing the PHY
layer vulnerabilities of cellular networks. Our analysis uses
LTE as an example, but the methodology applies to many
other present and future protocols. The contribution of paper
is threefold. We provide
1) a methodology for PHY layer testing of wireless proto-
cols,
2) open-source software enabling research and education
using software-defined radios (SDRs), and
3) empirical results with open-source SDR-based 4G LTE
systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews the LTE downlink control signaling which is the
focus of our analysis in this paper. Section III introduces our
methodology, Section IV provides experimental results and
analysis for LTE and section V concludes the paper.
II. CONTROL CHANNELS IN THE LTE DOWNLINK
Control channels in wireless networks are essential for
providing the capability for the system to operate properly
and efficiently. Using LTE as an example below we briefly
review some of the important Downlink (DL) LTE physical
control channels that are relevant for the experimental analysis
discussed in this work. Note that in LTE the Base Station is
referred to as the evolved NodeB (eNB) and the user terminal
is referred to as the user equipment (UE).
Primary and Secondary Synchronization Signals (PSS/SSS):
LTE uses two synchronization signals: the Primary Synchro-
nization Signal (PSS) and Secondary Synchronization Signal
(SSS). The PSS and SSS are broadcast by the eNB for slot and
frame synchronization. The PSS is constructed from Zadoff-
Chu sequences due to its strong Constant Amplitude Zero
Autocorrelation (CAZAC) properties.
The SSS is constructed from two maximal length sequences
(M-sequences). As all communication between the UE and
eNB requires time synchronization, disrupting the PSS or SSS
will not cause an immediate Denial of Service (DoS), but will
instead prevent a) new UEs from accessing the cell, and b)
idle UEs from re-synchronizing with the cell.
Physical Broadcast Channel (PBCH): The PBCH contains
the Master Information Block (MIB) which informs the UE
about the downlink bandwidth, resource length of the Hybrid
ARQ (HARQ) Indicator Channel (PHICH), and the System
Frame Number (SFN) for frame synchronization. The PBCH
is mapped to the central 72 subcarriers of four consecutive
OFDM symbols per frame. It is QPSK modulated with a 16-
bit CRC, but with an effective coding rate of 1/48.
Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH): The PD-
CCH carries critical control information, such as UE resource
allocation, modulation and coding scheme (MCS) of user
data, information about the HARQ parameters and precoding
matrices for MIMO. It is QPSK modulated with rate-1/3 con-
volutional coding and occupies the first few OFDM symbols
of each subframe. During the initial cell access procedure,
it informs the UE of the first System Information Block
(SIB1), without which the UE will be unable to complete the
cell attachment process. Additionally, after cell attachment, it
would be impossible for the UE to obtain service and decode
its data if the PDCCH is improperly decoded.
Physical Control Format Indicator Channel (PCFICH):
The PCFICH contains information regarding the size of the
PDCCH and is sent at the beginning of each subframe. It
contains the Control Format Indicator (CFI) which is 2 bits in
length, and is encoded using a code rate of 1/16. Therefore
corrupting the PCFICH will also corrupt detection of the
PDCCH at the UE.
Cell-Specific Reference Signals (CRS): The CRS carries
downlink pilot symbols that are used for channel estimation,
quality assessment and equalization. CRS is QPSK-modulated
and use a Gold sequence of length 31, which is initialized
using the cell ID value. The CRS symbols are distributed
sparsely in time and frequency, occupying about 5% of the Re-
source Elements (REs). The first position k0 of the CRS in the
LTE DL grid is determined by the Physical Cell Identity (PCI)
Nc,ID ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 503}, by the relation k0 = Nc,ID mod 6
(assuming the range of k0 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 5}).
III. PHY LAYER VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS
The methodology that we develop is based on testing
the vulnerabilities of a system by analyzing the individual
subsystems. By targeting a specific subsystem or a specific
combination of subsystems at a time, we can infer the weakest
component and revise it to improve the overall system ro-
bustness. Hence, we propose tools for assessing the individual
system components and metrics for evaluation. Here, we re-
gard the LTE control channel(s) to be the subsystem(s), for the
purpose of analysis. Although we present the tools and metrics
for LTE, rather than in an abstract way, the concepts are
applicable for other wireless protocols as well. The software
tools have been presented in [13] and are included here for
completeness.
A. Open-Source Software Tools
We propose a parametric framework for interference gener-
ation by using the same waveform as the target system. This
ensures that there is high correlation in the protocol signaling
between the interference and the target waveform(s). In the
case of LTE, individual subcarriers and OFDM symbols can be
allocated/blanked to rapidly generate wideband, narrowband,
and protocol-aware interference over any portion of the DL
LTE time-frequency grid. Note that other wireless standards,
including IEEE 802.11xx and emerging IoT standards, use
Fig. 1. OFDM-based parametric interference generation.
OFDM. Fig. 1 illustrates the general framework for OFDM-
based parametric interference generation. It allows generating
asynchronous and synchronous interference waveforms that
we build from the open source LTE library srsLTE [14] (for-
merly known as libLTE). The srsLTE library implements the
LTE uplink and downlink waveforms and supports commercial
off-the shelf hardware such as Universal Software Radio
Peripherals (USRPs). Broadly, we classify the interference
waveforms based on the time-synchronization requirements of
the jammer w.r.t. the target:
1) Asynchronous Interference Waveforms: The asyn-
chronous interference waveform generates interference on
specific subcarriers. This type of interference can be of certain
duration/duty cycle or continuous or discontinuous in time.
We can use this setup to generate any interference to LTE that
does not need accurate time alignment with the LTE frame. We
can also generate a fake PSS and/or SSS signal (for example,
to execute PSS/SSS spoofing as in [11]) by replacing OFDM
symbols with LTE synchronization sequences. As an example,
the spectrum of a 1.4 MHz interference waveform with three
blocks of active subcarriers is shown in Fig. 2. Assuming the
subcarrier indices k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 71}, the jammer transmits
only on subcarriers kj such that kj ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 35} (540 kHz
wide), kj ∈ {49, 50, · · · , 59} (165 kHz wide) and kj ∈ {71}
(15 kHz wide).
2) Synchronous Interference Waveforms: Transmitting on
top of specific physical channels requires synchronization with
the network to determine where the physical channels exist
in time. Therefore, we design an interferer that (1) acts as
a receiver and synchronizes with the eNB, in this case by
acquiring the legitimate PSS and SSS of the LTE cell and
(2) synchronously transmits its interference waveform to the
target. A configurable timing offset can be specified to account
for transmission and other delays. Fig. 3 illustrates the syn-
chronous interference waveform which targets the PSS/SSS.
B. Metrics for Performance Evaluation
We need a uniform metric that captures the RF differences
among the various physical control channels and signals.
In this regard, we devise a metric based on (a) jammer to
signal power ratio (JSR) values, (b) control channel occupancy
fraction in the LTE Frame, and (c) relative power w.r.t. the data
Fig. 2. Asynchronous interference waveform generation.
Fig. 3. Synchronous interference waveform: eNB signals which, for illustra-
tion purposes, consist of the PSS/SSS, the PBCH, and the CRS only (top and
bottom) and synchronous PSS/SSS interference (bottom).
channel. Equivalent metrics apply for other wireless standards
and additional metrics may need to be specified for the specific
analysis. For LTE, we define the following quantities:
1) Jammer to Signal Ratio per Resource Element
(JSRRE),
2) Jammer to Signal Ratio per Frame (JSRF ), and
3) Relative power w.r.t. the Physical Downlink Shared
Channel (PDSCH) (ρPDSCH).
1) JSRRE: It is defined as the ratio of the jammer power
to that of the LTE signal, assuming that all the LTE resource
elements (REs) have the same transmit power. We also con-
sider that the jammer allocates equal power on all subcarriers
at all times.
2) JSRF : In our experiments, the jammer is targeting spe-
cific control channels, all of which occupy different fractions
of the total number of REs per LTE DL frame. To account for
TABLE I
INDICATORS OF ALL CONSIDERED JAMMING STRATEGIES.
Target Periodicity Error Flag
Barrage Subframe PDCCH error/PCFICH error/synch error/
PBCH error
PSS/SSS Frame If frame synchronized: sync loss. If frame
does not synchronize: Unable to sync
PDCCH Subframe Decoded RNTI 6= SENTVALUE
PBCH Frame Decoded MIB 6= Default configuration
PCFICH Subframe Decoded CFI 6= 2
CRS Subframe PDCCH error/PCFICH error/synch error/
PBCH error
this, we define JSRF given by
JSRF = JSRRE × NT,F
Ntot,F
, (1)
where NT,F denotes the number of REs allocated to the
control channel per LTE frame, and Ntot,F the total number
of REs per LTE frame.
3) ρPDSCH : LTE allocates different power levels to differ-
ent physical channels. We introduce ρPDSCH and define it as
ρPDSCH =
PT
PPDSCH
, where PT is the power allocated by the
eNB to the control channel, and PPDSCH the power allocated
to the PDSCH in the same frame.
These three factors determine the overall jammer to signal
ratio as
JSRN = JSRF × ρPDSCH . (2)
The above relation is adapted from [15] to account for the non-
uniformity in power allocation for heterogeneous power allo-
cations across LTE’s physical downlink channels and signals.
Since JSRN represents the overall power requirements of the
jammer w.r.t. that of a DL LTE signal with unit power per
resource element, we use it to compare the relative robustness
of the control channels.
In order to compare the robustness of each control channel
to targeted interference, we also need to define events at the
receiver that constitute a successful jamming attack. Related
to that, we also set thresholds for the probability of error or
error rate Perr, beyond which the control channel is said to
be irreversibly corrupted. In essence, such a scenario will lead
to the UE operating with corrupted control information that
can cause severe system level issues, and in the worst case,
DoS. Table I describes the event (i.e. error flag in srsLTE) that
indicates a successful LTE DL jamming attack.
IV. LTE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES
A. Experimental Setup using Open-Source SDR Tools
Fig. 4 shows the experimental setup using components from
Virginia Tech’s LTE Testbed [16]. It features three Universal
Software Radio Peripherals (USRPs) to emulate the LTE eNB,
UE and the protocol-aware jammer. The jammer acquires the
PSS/SSS from the eNB in order to synchronize the jamming
signal with the UE as needed. The LTE DL signal and
the synchronous jamming signal are combined using radio
frequency (RF) power combiners. Variable attenuators in each
Fig. 4. Experimental setup of the jamming experiments.
RF path provide a means to control the JSR. RF cables are
used to connect the components. Therefore, the resulting LTE
system performance is interference-limited.
Each considered DL physical control channel is tested
using Ntrial = 105 trials of targeted interference. Each
trial composed of transmission of 1 subframe (for PCFICH,
PDCCH, CRS and Barrage jamming schemes) and 1 frame
(for PSS/SSS and PBCH jamming schemes). Table I indicates
the error event for each jamming scenario. The error rate for
each channel Perr is defined as the ratio of the the number
of frames (or subframes) for which the error flag (defined in
Table I) is active (Nerr), to the total number of frames (or
subframes) transmitted (Ntrial). The error rate is calculated
using the relation Perr = NerrNtrial . The JSR is computed using
(2), where the term ρPDSCH is experimentally obtained for
each jamming strategy, and is tabulated in Table II.
We define the error threshold Perr,th to be the value beyond
which DoS occurs. The corresponding values are summarized
in Table III. The choice of Perr,th for each strategy can be
justified as follows:
1) PBCH has a very low coding rate of 1/48, and is
spread across 4 OFDM frames. Hence, it is robust
against interference and we set a high error threshold
of Perr,th = 0.9.
2) PSS/SSS is comprised of interference-resilient signals
with very strong correlation properties [15]. Hence we
set an error threshold value of Perr,th = 0.5.
3) PCFICH carries the locations of the PDCCH, which has
a fairly high code-rate of 1/3. Hence, an error threshold
of Perr,th = 0.1 is considered to be sufficient to disrupt
these channels.
4) CRS is used for channel estimation and equalization
which is crucial to decode all the other control channels.
The aggregate Perr,th cannot be greater than that of all
other critical DL control channels and hence, we set
Perr,th = 0.1. The same reasoning applies for barrage
jamming as well.
The overall jammer to signal noise ratio (JSRN,DoS) repre-
sents the JSR value that results in Perr ≥ Perr,th, which in
turn results in DoS.
B. Analysis of DL Jamming Results
The jamming experiments were performed for all six down-
link jamming strategies of Tables I-III and the results are
shown in Fig. 5. The necessary JSR to sufficiently corrupt
TABLE II
EMPIRICALLY MEASURED VALUES OF ρPDSCH .
Jamming Strategy ρPDSCH (dB)
Barrage 0
PSS/SSS -5
PDCCH -5
PBCH -2
PCFICH -8
CRS -10
Fig. 5. Error rate as a function of JSR for the jamming experiments using
open-source SDR tools for a 1.4 MHz FD LTE signal.
TABLE III
LTE DL PHYSICAL CHANNEL VULNERABILITIES FOR 1.4 MHZ FD-LTE.
Target Fraction Complexity Perr,th to JSRN,DoS
of REs cause DoS (dB)
Barrage 100 % Very Low 0.1 -10
PSS/SSS 1.23 % Medium 0.5 5
PDCCH 23.4 % Medium 0.1 -16
PBCH 2.38 % Low 0.9 -3
PCFICH 0.2 % High 0.1 -19
CRS 4.76 % High 0.1 -26
each physical channel and cause DoS, is summarized in
Table III. We qualitatively comment on the complexity of
the jamming attack for a 1.4 MHz FD LTE system, based on
the degree of synchronization required to jam the subsystem
and the contiguity of targeted REs comprising the subsystem.
We see that PSS/SSS is the least vulnerable DL physical
channel. This is understandable since both the PSS and SSS
use very strong correlation sequences (Zadoff-Chu and M-
sequence respectively) that are inherently robust against noise
and interference. Even though PSS and SSS are very sparse,
the jammer needs more power than the LTE DL signal to
corrupt them to the point of DoS (due to synchronization
loss/inability to synchronize).
The PBCH is also resilient to jamming, since (a) it provides
only basic initial information, and (b) it has a very low coding
rate (cf. Section II). The PCFICH is robust to interference
Fig. 6. Error rate as a function of JSR for the jamming experiments using
open-source SDR tools for a 10 MHz FD LTE signal.
because of strong encoding, but its sparsity makes it suscepti-
ble to jamming relative to PDCCH. However, since jamming
the PCFICH has the same outcome as jamming the PDCCH,
the 3 dB gain of PCFICH w.r.t. PDCCH jamming is deemed
impractical for the jammer since the PCFICH’s sparsity makes
the jamming attack more complex and countermeasures have
been proposed in the literature [9].
We see that CRS, in the case of a perfectly synchronized
jamming attack, is highly vulnerable. This is due to (a) the
sparsity of the CRS in terms of the fraction of REs per
OFDM frame and (b) the dependence of all control and data
channels on accurate channel estimates. In practice, perfect
synchronization is difficult to achieve for a sparse and non-
contiguously distributed signal such as the CRS. However, the
jammer can target CRS subcarriers instead of CRS REs, which
is a very simple strategy since the CRS subcarrier locations
depend on the cell ID Nc,ID and remain constant for all users
of the cell. For this more practical case the jammer need not
synchronize with its target, thus reducing the complexity of
the attack at the cost of a higher JSR.
It is clear that the PDCCH should have the highest priority
for anti-jamming countermeasures because the PDCCH can
be easily targeted with a relatively low JSR. CRS follows
close behind, having by far the lowest required JSR to corrupt,
but a much higher complexity. Similarly, the PBCH and,
especially PSS/SSS are not high priority for anti-jamming;
while an attack may theoretically cause complete DoS by
targeting these subystems, the attackers require nearly as much
power as barrage jamming, making them less practical from
an attacker’s perspective.
C. Vulnerability Analysis for Higher LTE Bandwidths
The results discussed so far apply only to a LTE bandwidth
of 1.4 MHz. For higher LTE bandwidths, it is important to
note that the following control channels have the same number
of resource elements per frame for all LTE bandwidths, (a)
PSS/SSS, (b) PBCH and (c) PCFICH. Hence, these control
Fig. 7. JSRN required versus LTE bandwidth to cause Denial of Service
for all considered control channel attacks.
channels can be targeted by the jammer by transmitting the
same sum power as for a 1.4 MHz LTE system. For cases
(a)-(c) the required JSR (JSR(BW )N,DoS) to cause DoS for a LTE
system bandwidth BW can then be written as
JSR
(BW )
N,DoS = JSR
(1.4 MHz)
N,DoS − 10 log10
( BW
1.4 MHz
)
. (3)
However CRS, PDCCH and barrage jammers need to oc-
cupy the entire bandwidth. The JSRN requirements for all
other strategies are a function of the LTE bandwidth. Fig. 6
shows the error rate as a function of the JSR for a 10 MHz
FD-LTE system.
Fig. 7 shows the variation of JSRN,DoS as a function of
LTE system bandwidth (BW ) for each jamming strategy. We
see that (a) PSS/SSS will still be an inefficient attack for
system bandwidths of up to 20 MHz, (b) PBCH jamming is
more of an issue when compared with barrage jamming only
for BW ≥ 10 MHz, (c) PCFICH jamming performs better
than CRS jamming for BW ≥ 10 MHz, and (d) CRS jamming
always outperforms PDCCH jamming. An obvious way to
increase the resilience of the system would be to allocate all
the control channel REs (except the PSS/SSS) over the entire
LTE bandwidth. This would ensure that the jammer would
have to resort to wideband signaling to disrupt the LTE control
channels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has introduced a methodology for analyzing
the PHY layer vulnerability of wireless protocols. We have
developed a software suite for introducing protocol-aware
interference to a wireless system. Our software is applicable
to OFDM-based protocols. We applied it to target the LTE
RF downlink and showed how different subsystems of LTE
react differently to protocol-aware interference. The results
showed that the LTE synchronization signals (PSS/SSS) are
most resilient to synchronized jamming causing DoS. We
also observed that CRS, PCFICH and PDCCH are the most
vulnerable to protocol-aware jamming. The results presented
in this paper are based on open-source SDR-based LTE sys-
tems. Other systems will need different metrics and software
for testing, but the proposed methodology can be applied
for (1) methodical testing, (2) improving the robustness of
the subsystem and hence the entire system as in [17] and
(3) designing control channels to achieve a desired level of
robustness.
As LTE evolves, these vulnerabilities will need to be taken
into consideration while applying LTE for military and public
safety networks, and for designing interference-resilient next-
generation wireless protocols. Tradeoffs will be necessary to
balance efficiency, system complexity and robustness to smart
attackers. This will continue to be an important research area
that will significantly contribute to protocols and procedures
of 5G wireless networks.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank the the sponsors for their
support. This work was funded in part by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) under Grant CNS-1642873, and the De-
fense University Research Instrumentation Program (DURIP)
contract numbers W911NF-14-1-0553/0554 through the Army
Research Office.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Yang et al., “Safeguarding 5G Wireless Communication Networks
Using Physical Layer Security,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 20–27, April 2015.
[2] K. Pelechrinis, M. Iliofotou, and S. V. Krishnamurthy, “Denial of
Service Attacks in Wireless Networks: The Case of Jammers,” IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 245–257, Second
2011.
[3] Y. Zou, J. Zhu, X. Wang, and L. Hanzo, “A Survey on Wireless
Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances, and Future Trends,”
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 104, no. 9, pp. 1727–1765, Sept 2016.
[4] L. Lazos, S. Liu, and M. Krunz, “Mitigating Control-channel Jamming
Attacks in Multi-channel Ad Hoc Networks,” in Proceedings of the
Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security. ACM, 2009,
pp. 169–180.
[5] K. Bicakci and B. Tavli, “Denial-of-Service Attacks and Countermea-
sures in IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks,” Comput. Stand. Interfaces,
vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 931–941, Sept 2009.
[6] S. Liu, L. Lazos, and M. Krunz, “Thwarting Inside Jamming Attacks
on Wireless Broadcast Communications,” in Proceedings of the Fourth
ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2011, pp. 29–40.
[7] J. T. Chiang and Y. C. Hu, “Cross-Layer Jamming Detection and
Mitigation in Wireless Broadcast Networks,” IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 286–298, Feb 2011.
[8] X. He, H. Dai, and P. Ning, “A Byzantine Attack Defender in Cognitive
Radio Networks: The Conditional Frequency Check,” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 2512–2523, May 2013.
[9] J. Kakar, K. McDermott, V. Garg, M. Lichtman, V. Marojevic, and J. H.
Reed, “Analysis and Mitigation of Interference to the LTE Physical
Control Format Indicator Channel,” in IEEE Military Communications
Conference, Oct 2014, pp. 228–234.
[10] M. Lichtman, T. Czauski, S. Ha, P. David, and J. H. Reed, “Detection
and Mitigation of Uplink Control Channel Jamming in LTE,” in IEEE
Military Communications Conference, Oct 2014, pp. 1187–1194.
[11] M. Labib, V. Marojevic, and J. H. Reed, “Analyzing and Enhancing the
Resilience of LTE/LTE-A Systems to RF Spoofing,” in Standards for
Communications and Networking (CSCN), 2015 IEEE Conference on,
Oct 2015, pp. 315–320.
[12] M. Lichtman, R. P. Jover, M. Labib, R. M. Rao, V. Marojevic, and J. H.
Reed, “LTE/LTE-A Jamming, Spoofing, and Sniffing: Threat Assessment
and Mitigation,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 54, no. 4, pp.
54–61, April 2016.
[13] V. Marojevic, R. M. Rao, S. Ha, , and J. H. Reed, “Performance Analysis
of a Mission-Critical Portable LTE System in Targeted RF Interference,”
in Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC), IEEE, September 2017.
[14] “srsLTE - Open Source LTE,” https://github.com/srsLTE, 2016, [Online;
last accessed 23-October-2016].
[15] M. Lichtman, J. H. Reed, T. C. Clancy, and M. Norton, “Vulnerability
of LTE to Hostile Interference,” in Global Conference on Signal and
Information Processing (GlobalSIP), IEEE, Dec 2013, pp. 285–288.
[16] V. Marojevic, D. Chheda, R. M. Rao, R. Nealy, J.-M. Park, and
J. H. Reed, “Software-Defined Testbed enabling Rapid Prototyping
and Controlled Experimentation for the LTE Evolution,” in Wireless
Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), IEEE, March
2017.
[17] M. Labib, V. Marojevic, J. H. Reed, and A. I. Zaghloul, “Enhancing
the Robustness of LTE Systems: Analysis and Evolution of the Cell
Selection Process,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 55, no. 2, pp.
208–215, Feb 2017.
